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1. The concept of emergence has gained some popularity 
in the philosophy of mind and in metaphysico-epistemo-
logical explorations of our current scientific worldview. This 
concept is used to indicate that the ”higher” levels of reality 
(e.g., mentality, normativity) cannot be reduced to the 
”lower” ones (particularly the physical or physico-chemical 
level, as studied by physics and other natural sciences). 
Emergent properties are properties of a complex system 
that cannot be deduced from (what is known about) the 
properties of the parts of the system. Roughly, the idea is 
to save such things as mentality (consciousness), 
normativity, and cultural entities from the threatening 
reduction or elimination dreamed of by more extreme 
physicalists.1 
Some recent authors have suggested that the concept of 
emergence might be helpful in the epistemology of 
religious belief, rendering a theistic world-view scientifically 
acceptable. Given the generally naturalistic trend of 
contemporary scientific and philosophical thought, it is 
hardly surprising that theologians and other scholars 
examining religious phenomena have – even if they are 
theists – taken seriously the naturalistic lessons taught by 
science. Few people doubt the dependence of mentality or 
conscious experience on brain states and eventually on 
the physical world. While it has been suggested that a form 
of emergent dualism (though not Cartesian substance 
dualism) is defensible (Hasker 1999) and even, in the 
classical emergence discussion in the 1920s, that deity 
itself might be seen as the emergent evolutionary stage 
following consciousness (Alexander [1920]1979), several 
religiously inclined thinkers explore the epistemic creden-
tials of theism in the framework of nonreductive physical-
ism or naturalism (Drees 1996, McGrath 1998), thus 
reviving a form of natural theology. Even the Christian 
doctrine of bodily survival after death can, it has been 
claimed, be combined with nonreductive physicalism, or at 
least antidualism (Stump 1995; Forrest 1996; Barbour 
1999; Murphy 1999a, 1999b; Clayton 2000; Schouten 
2001). This is partly because the dualistic picture of a 
disembodied mind is not Christian: the Bible urges us to 
believe in an embodied self, a total person (Barbour 1999, 
363). Thus, a religious view of the self need not be 
dualistic; alternatively, one might attempt to develop a non-
Cartesian dualism compatible with materialism.2 Debates 
over these matters have been active in the interdisciplinary 
journal Zygon. The contributors’ views differ in details, but 
the general thrust is that the dialogue between science 
and religion can be enhanced by taking due notice of the 
antireductionist, emergentist world-picture painted by the 
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 I cannot offer any general discussion of the concept of emergence or its 
problems here. For more detailed treatments, see Stephan (1999), El-Hani 
and Pihlström (2002), and Pihlström (forthcoming). (This paper is abstracted 
from an on-going research project on this notion, to be carried on partly in 
cooperation with Professor C.N. El-Hani.) 
2
 Proposing the latter alternative, Stump (1995, 510ff.) reads Thomas Aquinas 
in an emergentist fashion: ”soul” is the Aquinian (and Aristotelian) name for the 
substantial form of a living material object; while a human soul can temporarily 
exist after the material body has perished, this state is ”unnatural” for it. 
(Resurrection means re-embodiment.) Mental properties – properties of the 
person, a totality of body and soul – are ”dependent on the configuration and 
composition of the whole; they are not identical to the properties of the mate-
rial parts of the whole, but they emerge from the properties and dynamic 
interactions of those parts” (519). Stump notes (525) that Samuel Alexander, 
in his classical theory, associated emergent properties (understood as configu-
rational patterns) with the distinction between matter and form. 
new sciences of complexity, and of nondualistic yet 
nonreductive theories of mind. 
The purpose of this paper is to take a brief critical look at 
this discussion. It is not easy to see how theism could be 
established on an emergentist basis in a manner compati-
ble with physicalism. I argue that appeals to the notion of 
emergence are hardly helpful in the epistemology of 
religious belief. I finally end up with Wittgensteinian 
considerations. 
2. While emergence is a popular theoretical concept in 
the above-mentioned debates, some contributors believe 
that a mere supervenience physicalism (or emergence 
construed as mind-body supervenience) is sufficient for a 
naturalistically acceptable theism that avoids dualism 
(Murphy 1999a, Clayton 2000, Schouten 2001). Those 
who rely on the idea of emergence tend to leave the notion 
unspecified, simply referring to the level structure of reality 
and to the arising of ”new” properties (Polkinghorne 1991). 
The following is a typical formulation: ”Traditional materi-
alistic thinking is replaced by an emergent, holistic 
approach in which the worldview of science is infused with 
a new subjectivity and with rich macroqualities.” (Sperry 
1991, 251.) ”Downward causation” is, however, often 
mentioned as a key feature of emergentism (ibid., 245; 
Peterson 1999, 291; Murphy 1999a, 555; Clayton 2000, 
633ff.): emergent properties have novel causal powers, 
influencing the parts of the system whose properties they 
are. Insofar as emergence is somehow defined, it is taken 
as obvious that it is real; according to Peacocke (1994, 
643-644), ”emergence” is ”the entirely neutral name for 
that general feature of natural processes wherein complex 
structures, especially in living organisms, develop 
distinctively new capabilities and functions at levels of 
greater complexity”. The term describes ”the observed 
phenomenon of the appearance of new capabilities, 
functions, etc., at greater levels of complexity” (658). In the 
same vein, Barbour (1999, 385) says that ”in evolutionary 
history and in the development of the individual organism 
there occur forms of order and levels of activity that are 
genuinely new and qualitatively different”, adding that a 
stronger version of emergence claims that ”events at 
higher levels are not determined by events at lower levels 
and are themselves causally effective”. These authors 
typically employ a diachronic (evolutionary) version of 
emergentism (cf. Peacocke 1999, 706-707).3 
From the perspective of the emergence discussion we 
find in philosophical literature (e.g., Stephan 1999), these 
formulations are unsatisfactory. Peacocke’s characteriza-
tion, for instance, fails to distinguish between truly 
emergent (irreducible) properties and other complex 
system properties. What is essential in his (and many 
others’) views is just the level structure of reality and of the 
corresponding sciences, supposedly leaving room for the 
level(s) of soul, meaning, value, etc. The problem of 
downward causation, in particular – which several authors, 
including Kim (1998), take to be the problem with 
emergentism and nonreductive physicalism in general – 
has received no detailed discussion by thinkers interested 
in a reconciliation of science and religion via emergentism. 
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 On the distinction between diachronic and synchronic emergence, see 
Stephan (1999). 
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Do the ”emergents”, e.g. soul, do the causal work they are 
supposed to do qua emergents, and if so, is this view 
compatible with the physicalist conviction of a causal 
closure of the physical? Or are they epiphenomenal, after 
all, leaving genuine causal powers to their physical 
supervenience base? It is not necessary to solve this 
dilemma in order to speak about emergence, for many 
human capacities we take to ”emerge” from lower levels of 
reality can be accounted for in noncausal terms (Pihlström 
forthcoming), but the problem should be recognized. 
As Peterson (1999, 291-292) admits, emergentism may 
not, then, take seriously enough the questions of how, 
specifically, the levels interact; it provides only a general 
framework for the study of the mind as a natural phe-
nomenon. It is only seldom that Kim-type worries about 
downward causation are raised in these discussions (see, 
however, Bielfeldt 1999, 622-623; Murphy 1999b, 637; 
Clayton 2000, 633). When these worries arise, they are set 
aside too easily (as Clayton does), relying on something 
like ”emergentist supervenience” which allegedly saves 
mental causation and leaves room for a religious reality.4 
One of the few recent contributions in which the combi-
nation of (emergentist or supervenientist) physicalism and 
theism is seriously challenged5 is William Vallicella’s 
(1998). He rejects eliminativism, type-type identity theory, 
supervenientism, emergentism, and ”the constitution view” 
(i.e., the view that persons are materially constituted 
beings) as five ”theologically useless physicalisms” 
(163ff.). The argument is largely based on Kim’s criticism 
of nonreductive physicalism. Regarding emergentism (167-
170), Vallicella points out that even if the human soul were 
seen as an emergent substance or as having emergent 
properties, problems would remain, as neither divine nor 
angelic consciousness can be understood as emerging 
from matter, upon any Christian construal: ”It is analytic 
that emergence is emergence from a physical base, and in 
the case of God and angels classically conceived there is 
no physical base. Moreover, it is analytic that to emerge is 
to come into being, and God’s consciousness does not 
come into being” (169). Vallicella (170) also argues against 
Stump’s (1995) Aquinian suggestion of combining 
materialism and dualism (and the possibility of survival), 
insisting that an emergent property cannot continue to 
exist after the physical system whose property it is falls 
apart. 
If a reconciliation of science and theism were possible 
through emergentism, this would constitute an intellectual 
breakthrough of enormous magnitude. No doubts about 
the cultural or generally human significance of the notion 
of emergence would remain. Unfortunately, the research 
program run by theistically inclined naturalists seems to 
me hopeless; as Vallicella (1998, 176) puts it, physicalism 
and theism are ”competing Weltanschauungen”. One 
problem with views seeking to reconcile them, and with the 
on-going discussion of emergence and theism in Zygon 
(and elsewhere), is – as in the systematically philosophical 
emergence literature we find elsewhere – an unargued 
commitment to strong metaphysical realism. It is presup-
posed that both scientific and religious language purport to 
refer to a fundamentally concept- and language-independ-
ent world and that, therefore, religion and science must be 
coherently fitted into one grand theory of the world, if we 
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 Clayton’s (2000) view is confused: he calls his position ”emergentist monism” 
(arguing that the world should be conceived of as a single physical system) 
but nevertheless subscribes to both ontological and explanatory pluralism in 
his theory of levels (644).  
5
 I am not implying that this combination is generally accepted; on the con-
trary, most philosophers hardly take it seriously. To ”challenge” the idea is to 
deal with it explicitly and argue against it.  
want to retain both. Against this assumption, a more 
Wittgensteinian-oriented thinker may argue that religion 
and science are different human practices (or groups of 
practices) with their characteristic normative structures. 
Quite different ”moves” are allowed in these different 
(families of) language-games; for example, the ”soul” 
allegedly rendered ”scientifically acceptable” in emergen-
tism would hardly have a place in religious language-use. 
Insofar as one abandons metaphysical realism in 
general philosophy, including the metaphysics and 
epistemology of emergence, one should abandon it in the 
philosophy of religion as well.6 No ordinary theism will be 
defensible, if we choose this strategy (because theistic 
metaphysics in its common forms can hardly be main-
tained if we give up metaphysical realism), but nor do we 
have any desperate need for an epistemological recon-
ciliation of religion and science (via emergence or other 
conceptual innovations). A pragmatic pluralism emerges. 
3. The neglect of Wittgensteinian alternatives in the 
emergence debate parallels the eclipse of these possibili-
ties in the metaphysical-realism-based mainstream 
analytic philosophy of religion.7 From a Wittgensteinian 
point of view, the interesting way to promote the science–
religion dialogue and to seek (inconclusively) possibilities 
for a reconciliation is through a pragmatic pluralism 
drawing attention to the fact that people act differently 
within different practices, having different goals and 
different methods for achieving their goals. Such variability 
is constitutive of human life as we know it. This general 
”pragmatist” idea is not too far from Wittgenstein’s 
emphasis on the plurality of language-games which has 
had some influence in the philosophy of religion.8 Science 
and religion serve different human purposes and may (if 
this un-Wittgensteinian formulation is allowed) be 
understood as establishing different ontologies that need 
not be unified into a single all-inclusive theory. Whether 
mutually irreconcilable ontological commitments can be 
endorsed by one and the same thinker is a difficult 
question inviting the problem of relativism; yet, episte-
mologists of religious belief should examine this question, 
instead of taking the reconciliatory task for granted and 
developing emergentist pseudo-solutions to it. Emergentist 
theists misleadingly hold that scientific and religious 
conceptualizations of human experience must refer to the 
same ”world”, reality in itself, construed in a metaphysical-
realist fashion. 
It is, then, metaphysical realism that leads both emer-
gentism and the philosophy of religion astray (and 
impedes synthesizing the two). Both, and their potential 
dialogue, could be enriched by questioning the realistic 
premises that most parties to contemporary debates 
presuppose. Such criticism can be based upon Wittgen-
steinian considerations, though related anti-metaphysi-
cally-realist options, including pragmatism, are also 
available. Just as Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion 
have denied that religious belief could be evaluated on the 
epistemic principles of scientific theorizing, the metaphysi-
cal conceptions of the mind underlying emergence 
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 This is not to give up pragmatic realism about religious issues (cf. Pihlström 
1998). I should note that although I have relied on Vallicella’s critique of 
theistically reinterpreted physicalism, he does not question the realistic 
assumptions of the discourse he criticizes.  
7
 For an informative discussion of the ways in which Anglo-American philoso-
phers of religion tend to endorse realistic theism, see Koistinen (2000). Also 
authors who (like some contributors to Zygon) wish to replace traditional 
theism by pan(en)theism are firmly committed to metaphysical realism. 
8
 Barbour (1999, 385) describes his view as ”ontological pluralism” but does 
not ground it in Wittgensteinian arguments. I see Wittgensteinian philosophy of 
religion as, broadly speaking, belonging to the pragmatist tradition, but this is 
not a topic I can pursue here. 
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theories (viz., nonreductive physicalism) may be subordi-
nated to a Wittgensteinian critique. Today, typical 
philosophical treatments of consciousness and psycho-
logical concepts are scientistic, failing to take the Wittgen-
steinian perspective seriously (Schroeder 2001). 
I cannot, of course, present any full-blown account of 
religion – or mind – in these scarce pages. I have only 
sketched why some recent nonreductive physicalists’ 
attempts to epistemically ”save” theism by referring to 
emergence are misguided. Nothing has been said against 
religious faith as such (nor in favor of such faith, for that 
matter). We may, by drawing attention to the complexities, 
variations and indeterminacies of our actual linguistic 
practices themselves, try to trace the true similarities and 
differences of (say) scientific and religious activities.9 In 
this process, the possibility of offering a Wittgensteinian 
reconceptualization of emergentism should be explored. 
Accordingly, my message is not purely negative; I am not 
denying that there are interconnections between emergen-
ce theories and Wittgenstein’s (1953) and his followers’ 
picture of human beings as naturally language-using 
creatures. A form of antireductionism, in particular, is 
common to both: language is a rule-governed activity, 
something ”more” than mere actual verbal behavior; yet, it 
undeniably emerges from factualities of that behavior. This 
emergence deserves philosophical scrutiny, whether we 
are interested in the peculiarities of our religious or mental 
vocabularies. But the philosopher’s task is to examine the 
(pragmatic) preconditions of meaningfulness in these 
areas, not to engage in quasi-scientific speculations. 
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